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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JOSEPH MITCHELL PARSONS, ) 
) 
Plaintiff/Appellant, ) PETITION FOR REHEARING 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
M. ELDON BARNES, ) Case No. 920126 
) Priority No. 1 
Defendant/Appellee. ) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON PETITION FOR REHEARING 
The basic issue presented is whether the Court's determination that the remedy for the 
error committed at trial in the double counting of aggravating circumstances should only be 
applied prospectively. A related issue is whether the Court correctly determined that Parsons 
was not prejudiced by the error committed at trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
For purposes of this petition, this Court's statement of the case is generally sufficient: 
Plaintiff Joseph Mitchell Parsons ["Parsons"] appeals from the denial of 
his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
On August 30, 1987, Parsons was hitchhiking near Barstow, California, 
when the victim, Richard L. Ernest, offered him a ride to Denver, Colorado. 
Parsons accepted. At 3:30 the next morning, the two men stopped to sleep at the 
Lunt Park rest area on Interstate Highway 15 near Cedar City, Utah. Both men 
were settling into sleep when, according to Parsons. Ernest made two sexual 
advances. The men struggled, and Parsons stabbed Ernest in the chest several 
times with a five-inch double-edged knife. 
Parsons drove about a mile from the rest area and pushed Ernest's body 
onto the shoulder of the highway He then drove to a service station/convenience 
store in Beaver, Utah, where he changed his clothes, cleaned out the car and 
discarded Ernest's personal belongings in a trash dumpster Using the victim's 
credit card, he purchased gas and food From Beaver, he drove to Richfield, 
Utah, where he again used Ernest's credit card to purchase several items and to 
get a motel room Later that day, police officers were alerted to Parsons' unusual 
activities at the convenience store and to his fraudulent credit card purchases At 
4 15 p m , officers found him sleeping in Ernest's car at a rest area near Salina, 
Utah, and arrested him The next morning police otticers discovered the 
victim's body 
On September 2, the Iron County prosecutor tiled an information charging 
Parsons with first degree murder and aggravated robbery The same day, the 
prosecutor took the statements of two witnesses under oath at his office, one from 
Beverly Ernest, the victim's widow, and one from Chad Williams, an employee 
at the Beaver convenience store 
The fifth district court began a preliminary hearing on September 17 but 
discontinued the proceeding at the request of Parsons' appointed counsel The 
next day, on the advice of counsel, Parsons pleaded guilty to first degree murder 
in violation of Utah Code Ann § 76-5-202 l Specifically, he pleaded to the 
offense as defined in section 76-5-202(1 )(h) (intentionally or knowingly causing 
the death of another having been previously convicted of a felony involving the 
use or threat of violence to another person) In addition Parsons pleaded guilty 
to aggravated robbery and theft of an operable motor vehicle The sentencing 
jury imposed the death sentence We affirmed the sentence on direct appeal 
State v Parsons, 781 P 2d 1275 (Utah 1989) 
On March 8, 1990, Parsons filed a pro se petition for habeas corpus 
review of the third district court Approximately seven months later, his new 
appointed counsel filed an amended petition asserting several instances of 
ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal The petition also raised 
a constitutional issue independent of the ineffective assistance allegations 
1
 Following this verdict, the statute was amended in 1991, deleting the first degree murder 
classification and making the crime "aggravated murder " Utah Code Ann § 76-5-202 (Supp 
1993) 
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Parsons contended that by taking the sworn statements of witnesses without giving 
notice to the defense, the prosecutor violated his federal constitutional rights to 
counsel and to confront the witnesses against him, U.S. Const, amend. VI, as 
well as his federal and state constitutional rights to due process. U.S. Const, 
amend. XIV; Utah Const, art. I, § 7. 
Following an evidentiary hearing, the third district court denied the writ, 
holding that Parsons had received effective assistance of counsel. The court 
addressed the constitutional question solely as an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel 
claim, not as a substantive constitutional error. The court denied compensation 
for appointed counsel in the habeas proceeding, holding that it was a matter for 
legislative rather than judicial resolution. Parsons appeals. 
Parsons v. Barnes, No. 920126, slip. op. at 1-2 (Utah Jan. 11, 1994) (a copy of the full opinion 
is attached to this petition as Addendum I). On appeal, the Court affirmed the court below. 
Ibid. Parsons was given additional fourteen (14) days to file the instant petition. See Addendum 
II (Motion and Order for Additional Time to File Petition for Rehearing). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The facts pertinent to this petition are set forth in the Statement of Case, above, or in the 
argument portion of this brief. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This Court should have ordered the parties to brief the question whether the error of 
double counting aggravating circumstances committed at trial in this case should be applied 
prospectively. Additionally, the Court should have applied the harmless constitutional error 
standard in resolving whether Parsons was prejudiced by the trial error. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A petition for rehearing is appropriate when the Court has misinterpreted or overlooked 
the relevant law. See Cummins v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 172-73, 129 P. 619, 624 (1913). The 
argument portion of this brief will demonstrate that Parsons' petition is properly before the Court 
and should be granted. 
ARGUMENT 
One of the issues raised by Parsons on appeal concerned the double counting of 
aggravating circumstances. The Court dealt with the issue in its written opinion at pages 16-20. 
The Court found that Parsons' claim of double counting should have been raised by trial counsel 
and, "in failing to object to the special verdict form . . . counsel's performance fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness." Parsons, slip op., at 18. 
The Court went on to state that "in the future, jury instructions or special verdict forms 
which contain either of the two murder-robbery factors in Section 76-5-202(1 )(d) should not 
contain the pecuniary gain factor as well. Otherwise, the defendant is essentially condemned 
'twice for the same culpable act.'" Parsons, slip op., at 19 (cited case omitted). The Court 
concluded, however: 
In deciding whether Parsons was prejudiced, we must conclude that the jury did 
as it was instructed to do. No defendant is entitled "to the luck of a lawless 
decision maker." . . . Therefore, our assessment of prejudice proceeds "on the 
assumption that the decision maker is reasonably conscientiously and impartially 
applying the standards that govern the decision." 
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Parsons, slip op., at 20 (citations omitted). 
The Court's conclusion above undercuts the requirements of the Sixth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution, Article 1, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution, and cases interpreting 
those provisions. The Strickland1 prejudice test applied by the Court in this case is, in essence, 
a harmless error analysis, because the Court had earlier found that counsel's performance was 
deficient under the Sixth Amendment. See Parsons, slip, op., at 18. See generally Delaware 
v. ArsdaH, 475 U.S. 673, 678-84 (1986) (discussing harmlessness of errors of constitutional 
magnitude). Consequently, because there was an error of constitutional magnitude, this Court 
should have called on the parties to brief its harmlessness and, more specifically, should have 
imposed on the State the burden of proving harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt. See 
Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 678-84; Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). 
In addition, the Court's conclusion on the prejudice to Parsons contravenes Article 1, 
Section 11 of the Utah Constitution, mandating that "[a]ll courts shall be open, and every 
person, for an injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have a remedy by 
due course of law, which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay. . . . " Utah 
Const, art. 1, § 11. 
In the instant case, the Court did not ask counsel, nor was counsel given a full 
opportunity to brief and argue the issue of appropriate remedy for the error committed by the 
2
 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
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trial court and/or counsel. The question regarding the appropriate remedy and whether it should 
be prospectively applied is one that has not been briefed. Parsons moves this Court to allow the 
parties to brief the issue, so that Parsons can receive proper remedy at law under Article I, 
Section 11, as well as the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing argument, the Court should grant and modify its opinion to 
conform to Utah law or, at least, order the parties to brief this particular issue. Utah R. App. 
P. 35(c). 
Counsel certifies that this petition is presented in good faith and not for delay. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of February, 1994. 
RONALD J. YENGICH, #3580 
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
175 East 400 South, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 355-0320 
GREGORY J. SANDERS, #2858 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
175 East 400 South, Suite 330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-3773 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby declare that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Petition for 
Rehearing, postage prepaid, this day of February, 1994, to Kris Leonard, Assistant 
Attorney General, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114. 
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ADDENDUM I 
SLIP OPTNTON 
PARSONS v. BARNES 
77i£5 opinion is subject to revision before final 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
00O00 
Joseph Mitchell Parsons, No. 920126 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
F I L E D 
v. January 11, 1994 
M. Eldon Barnes, in his 
capacity as Warden of the 
Utah State Prison, 
Defendant and Appellee. Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable David S. Young 
Attorneys: Ronald J. Yengich, Gregory J. Sanders, Kirk Gibbs, 
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff 
R. Paul Van Dam, Att'y Gen., Kris Leonard, Asst. 
Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for defendant 
HOWE, Justice; 
Plaintiff Joseph Mitchell Parsons appeals from the 
denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
On August 30, 1987, Parsons was hitchhiking near 
Barstow, California, when the victim, Richard L. Ernest, offered 
him a ride to Denver, Colorado. Parsons accepted. At 3:00 the 
next morning, the two men stopped to sleep at the Lunt Park rest 
area on Interstate Highway 15 near Cedar City, Utah. Both men 
were settling into sleep when, according to Parsons, Ernest made 
two sexual advances. The men struggled, and Parsons stabbed 
Ernest in the chest several times with a five-inch double-edged 
knife. 
Parsons drove about a mile from the rest area and 
pushed Ernest's body onto the shoulder of the highway. He then 
drove to a service station/convenience store in Beaver, Utah, 
where he changed his clothes, cleaned out the car, and discarded 
Ernest's personal belongings in a trash dumpster. Using the 
victim's credit card, he purchased gas and food. From Beaver, he 
drove to Richfield, Utah, where he again used Ernest's credit 
card to purchase several items and to get a motel room. Later 
that day, police officers were alerted to Parsons' unusual 
activities at the convenience store and to his fraudulent credit 
card purchases. At 4:15 p.m., officers found him sleeping in 
Ernest's car at a rest area near Salina, Utah, and arrested him. 
The next morning, police officers discovered the victim's body. 
On September 2, the Iron County prosecutor filed an 
information charging Parsons with first degree murder and 
aggravated robbery. The same day, the prosecutor took the 
statements of two witnesses under oath at his office, one from 
Beverly Ernest, the victim's widow, and one from Chad Williams, 
an employee at the Beaver convenience store. 
The fifth district court began a preliminary hearing on 
September 17 but discontinued the proceeding at the request of 
Parsons' appointed counsel. The next day, on the advice of 
counsel, Parsons pleaded guilty to first degree murder in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202.1 Specifically, he 
pleaded to the offense as defined in section 76-5-202(1)(h) 
(intentionally or knowingly causing the death of another having 
been previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat 
of violence to another person). In addition, Parsons pleaded 
guilty to aggravated robbery and theft of an operable motor 
vehicle. The sentencing jury imposed the death sentence. We 
affirmed the sentence on direct appeal. State v. Parsons, 781 
P.2d 1275 (Utah 1989). 
On March 8, 1990, Parsons filed a pro se petition for 
habeas corpus review in the third district court. Approximately 
seven months later, his new appointed counsel filed an amended 
petition asserting several instances of ineffective assistance of 
counsel at trial and on appeal. The petition also raised a 
constitutional issue independent of the ineffective assistance 
allegations. Parsons contended that by taking the sworn 
statements of witnesses without giving notice to the defense, the 
prosecutor violated his federal constitutional rights to counsel 
and to confront the witnesses against him, U.S. Const, amend. VI, 
as well as his federal and state constitutional rights to due 
process. U.S. Const, amend. XIV; Utah Const, art. I, § 7. 
Following an evidentiary hearing, the third district 
court denied the writ, holding that Parsons had received 
effective assistance of counsel. The court addressed the 
constitutional question solely as an ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claim, not as a substantive constitutional error. The 
court denied compensation for appointed counsel in the habeas 
proceeding, holding that it was a matter for legislative rather 
than judicial resolution. Parsons appeals. 
1
 Following this verdict, the statute was amended in 1991, 
deleting the first degree murder classification and making the 
crime "aggravated murder." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (Supp. 
1993) . 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In deciding habeas appeals, we review conclusions of 
law for correctness, according "no deference to the lower court's 
conclusions." Gerrish v. Barnes, 844 P.2d 315, 318-19 (Utah 
1992) (citing Fernandez v. Cook, 783 P.2d 547, 549 (Utah 1989)). 
However, "the trial court's factual findings shall not be set 
aside on appeal unless clearly erroneous." State v. Tyler, 850 
P.2d 1250, 1253 (Utah 1993). Ineffective-assistance-of-counsel 
claims present a mixed question of law and fact. Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 698, reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 1267 
(1984); State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990). 
DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS, RIGHT TO COUNSEL, 
AND RIGHT TO CONFRONT WITNESSES 
As explained, on the same day he charged Parsons with 
first degree murder, the prosecutor took the statements of 
Williams and Mrs. Ernest under oath. Parsons now argues that by 
taking these sworn statements without giving notice to the 
defense, the prosecutor violated his federal constitutional right 
to counsel and to confront the witnesses against him, U.S. Const, 
amend. VI, and his federal and state constitutional rights to due 
process. U.S. Const, amend. XIV; Utah Const, art. I, § 7. 
Parsons raises this argument independent of his ineffective 
assistance allegations. 
Habeas relief is available where a defendant has 
suffered an "obvious injustice" or "substantial and prejudicial 
denial of a constitutional right." Gerrish v. Barnes, 844 P.2d 
at 319; Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1034 (Utah 1989). However, 
the writ can neither substitute for, nor perform the function of, 
regular appellate review. Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 
1104 (Utah 1983); see, e.g.f Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1034 
(Utah 1989); Bundy v. DeLand, 763 P.2d 803, 804 (Utah 1988); 
Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 96, 98-99, 440 P.2d 968, 969 (1968). 
For this reason, a "party may not raise issues in a habeas corpus 
petition that could or should have been raised on direct appeal." 
Fernandez, 783 P.2d at 549. However, where "unusual 
circumstances are present that justify the failure to raise the 
issue on direct appeal, a court may entertain such a claim raised 
for the first time in the habeas corpus petition." Id. 
The State argues that Parsons' substantive 
constitutional arguments are procedurally barred because he 
failed to raise them on direct appeal and because he has not 
shown "unusual circumstances" justifying his failure to do so. 
While it is true that he has not alleged the requisite unusual 
circumstances, "procedural default is not always determinative of 
a collateral attack on a conviction" where, as in this case, "it 
is alleged that the trial was not conducted within the bounds of 
basic fairness or in harmony with constitutional standards." 
Hurst, 777 P.2d at 103 6. We therefore reach the merits of 
3 No. 920126 
Parsons' federal constitutional arguments. However, after 
careful consideration, we conclude that his Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights were not violated.2 
Rule 14(h) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
exclusively governs the taking of depositions in criminal 
cases.3 See State v. Nielsen, 522 P.2d 1366, 1367 (Utah 1974) 
(holding that rule 30 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
permitting discovery depositions, does not apply to criminal 
cases). It permits depositions in narrow circumstances: 
1
 We do not address Parsons7 due process claim under 
article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution because he has 
nominally relied on the Utah Constitution while actually relying 
on the parallel federal provision in the Fourteenth Amendment. 
We reaffirm our statement in State v. Laffertv, 749 P.2d 1239, 
1247 n.5 (Utah 1988), vacated on other grounds, Laffertv v. Cook, 
949 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir. 1991), that "[a]s a general rule, we 
will not engage in state constitutional analysis unless an 
argument for different analyses under the state and federal 
constitutions is briefed." Parsons has not briefed his state due 
process claim, and we will not "engage in constructing arguments 
out of whole cloth" on his behalf. Id. 
3
 Section 77-22-2 of the Utah Code permits county attorneys 
to subpoena witnesses and to "compel their attendance and 
testimony under oath." Utah Code Ann. § 77-22-2(2)(a) (Supp. 
1993). The county attorney may exercise this power only in 
conjunction with a criminal investigation with "approval of the 
district court and for good cause shown." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-22-2(1)(a) (Supp. 1993). A county prosecutor proceeds under 
section 77-22-2 prior to commencing prosecution of a defendant or 
defendants. KUTV Inc. v. Conder, 635 P.2d 412, 414 (Utah 1981). 
The legislature's purpose in granting subpoena powers to 
prosecutors is "to provide a method of keeping information gained 
from investigations secret both to protect the innocent and to 
prevent criminal suspects from having access to information prior 
to prosecution." Utah Code Ann. § 77-22-1. For this reason, the 
statute does not require the prosecutor to give notice of the 
proceedings to persons being investigated, nor does it require 
such persons and their counsel to be present during the 
proceedings. Utah Code Ann. § 77-22-2(3)-(4) . 
The sworn statements at issue are not those contemplated by 
section 77-22-2. The prosecutor testified that in taking the 
sworn statements, he was not proceeding pursuant to any 
investigative subpoena power. In addition, he took the 
statements of Williams and Mrs. Ernest after charges had been 
filed against Parsons. Because there was no need to keep 
investigatory information secret, the prosecutor immediately gave 
both statements to defense counsel. 
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(h) Whenever a material witness is 
about to leave the state, or is so ill or 
infirm as to afford reasonable grounds for 
believing that he will be unable to attend a 
trial or hearing, either party may, upon 
notice to the other, apply to the court for 
an order that the witness be examined 
conditionally by deposition. Attendance of 
the witness at the deposition may be 
compelled by subpoena. The defendant shall 
be present at the deposition and the court 
shall make whatever order is necessary to 
effect such attendance. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 14. 
When a prosecutor takes a statement that does not 
conform to the requirements of rule 14(h), he or she has not 
taken a deposition even if the witness gives the statement under 
oath. Admittedly, the term "deposition" is sometimes "used in a 
broad sense to describe any written statement verified by oath." 
23 Am. Jur. 2d Depositions and Discovery § 108 (1983).4 
However, according to rule 14(h), a statement under oath is not a 
deposition unless the court has ordered the proceeding, the 
deposing party has given notice to the other party, the defendant 
is present, and the witness being deposed is about to leave the 
state or is so ill that his or her attending the trial is 
unlikely. At the habeas proceeding, the prosecutor testified 
that he was not proceeding under rule 14(h) when he took the 
statements of Williams and Mrs. Ernest. Rather, he took the 
statements "to preserve and gain information" and "to put 
everything in perspective—times, dates, who did what." He did 
not apply to the court for an order to take the statements, nor 
did he notify Parsons. Accordingly, we agree with the trial 
court that the statements of Williams and Mrs. Ernest "were not 
xdepositions', but were rather xsworn statements' generated by a 
careful and thoughtful investigative prosecutor." While no 
statutory or procedural rule affirmatively authorizes a 
prosecutor to take investigatory statements outside the confines 
of rule 14(h), due process of law is not offended when a 
prosecutor chooses to do so. 
In fact, the record indicates that Parsons benefited 
from the statements. The habeas court found it likely that the 
prosecutor took the statements before defense counsel was 
appointed, thereby preserving information for Parsons when it was 
fresh in the minds of two critical witnesses. Likewise, defense 
counsel used Mrs. Ernest/s sworn statement at the sentencing 
4
 It appears that the prosecutor was using "deposition" in 
this broad sense when he informed Williams and Mrs. Ernest that 
he was going to take their deposition. 
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hearing for impeachment purposes. Parsons enjoyed the benefits 
of the sworn statements at trial without objection but now argues 
that taking the statements violated his right to due process. 
This inconsistency smacks of invited error, which is 
"procedurally unjustified and vip.wgri wS-hh rH^f^vYvr." State v, 
Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 560-61 (Utah 1987); see, e.g.. State v. 
Smith, 776 P.2d 929, 932 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("A defendant 
cannot lead the court into error by failing to object and then 
later, when he is displeased with the verdict, profit by his 
actions.M). 
Parsons' Sixth Amendment claims must also fail. The 
"primary object of the constitutional right of confrontation is 
to prevent depositions and ex parte affidavits from being used 
against the accused at trial in lieu of personal examination and 
cross-examination of the witness against him." State v. 
Anderson, 612 P.2d 778, 785 (Utah 1980). The statements in 
question were not used in place of personal examination. Both 
Williams and Mrs. Ernest testified at the sentencing hearing, and 
Parsons had full opportunity to confront them at that time. 
Parsons argues that the threat of perjury prosecution 
may have prevented Williams and Mrs. Ernest from deviating from 
their sworn statements when subjected to cross-examination at the 
sentencing hearing. He contends that this chilling of truthful 
testimony would not have occurred if the prosecutor had not 
placed Williams and Mrs. Ernest under oath when he took their 
statements. We are not persuaded. Parsons' argument presumes 
that Williams and Mrs. Ernest gave false statements to the 
prosecutor and that neither the oath nor the threat of perjury 
prosecution deterred them from doing so. The more probable 
presumption is that the oath had its intended effect. The 
purpose of the oath is to "ensure that the affiant consciously 
recognizes his or her legal obligation to tell the truth." 58 
Am. Jur. 2d Oath and Affirmation § 6 (1989). It is regarded as 
the "highest test of truth" and is the "instrument appropriated 
by the law for the ascertainment of the truth in judicial 
investigations." Id. Thus, the oath and its attendant penalties 
for false swearing are the best assurance that the investigatory 
statements of Williams and Mrs. Ernest were true.5 By taking 
the statements under oath, the prosecutor did not chill truthful 
testimony at the sentencing hearing. Rather, he ensured that the 
testimony of both witnesses would comport with their prior 
truthful statements. 
5
 Section 78-24-17 of the Utah Code sets out the form of the 
oath as follows: "You do solemnly swear (or affirm) that the 
evidence you shall give in this issue (or matter) pending between 
and shall be the truth, 
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God (or, 
under the pains and penalties of perjury)." 
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Furthermore, Parsons' claims are at best speculative. 
He has not shown that Williams or Mrs. Ernest would have 
testified differently at the sentencing hearing had their initial 
sworn statements not been taken under oath* Therefore, we must 
conclude that any benefit Parsons might have gained by having 
counsel present when the prosecutor took the statements could 
also have been realized during cross-examination at the 
sentencing hearing. For these reasons, we hold that the taking 
of investigatory statements under oath by the prosecution without 
notice to the defense did not violate Parsons' federal rights to 
counsel, to confront witnesses, or to due process. U.S. Const, 
amends. VI, XIV. 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
As explained above, absent the existence of unusual 
circumstances, a "party may not raise issues in a habeas corpus 
petition that could or should have been raised on direct appeal." 
Fernandez v. Cook, 783 P.2d 547, 549 (Utah 1989). We have held 
that unusual circumstances exist when trial counsel represented 
the defendant on direct appeal and the defendant in a subsequent 
habeas proceeding contends that he had ineffective assistance of 
counsel at trial, on appeal, or both. Id. at 549-50. The reason 
for this rule is that trial counsel cannot reasonably be expected 
to raise the issue of his or her own incompetence on appeal. 
Because the same attorney represented Parsons both at trial and 
on direct appeal, Parsons' claims of ineffective assistance are 
properly before us. 
Parsons argued thirteen counts of ineffective 
assistance of counsel in the habeas court, eight of which he 
raises on this appeal. Specifically, he contends that his 
counsel (1) failed to object to and raise on appeal the 
prosecutor's taking of sworn statements without notice to the 
defense, (2) failed to conduct adequate pretrial investigation, 
(3) failed to object to or raise on appeal the prosecutor's 
refusal to consent to waiving the preliminary hearing, advising 
Parsons instead to plead guilty without obtaining any meaningful 
benefit in return, (4) failed to adequately explore contact 
between a juror and a prosecution witness, (5) failed to file a 
formal discovery motion, (6) failed to spend adequate time with 
Parsons in preparation, (7) failed to conduct adequate voir dire, 
and (8) failed to object to the special verdict form. Parsons 
points to these same allegations as evidence of cumulative error. 
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), 
the United States Supreme Court established a two-part test for 
determining when a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to effective 
assistance of counsel has been violated. We have adopted that 
test as follows: 
To prevail, a defendant must show, first, 
that his counsel rendered a deficient 
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performance in some demonstrable manner, 
which performance fell below an objective 
standard of reasonable professional judgment 
and, second, that counsel,s performance 
prejudiced the defendant. 
Bundy v. DeLandf 763 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1988); see, e.g.. State 
v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182, 186-87 (Utah 1990); State v. Carter, 
776 P.2d 886, 893 (Utah 1989); State v. Frame. 723 P.2d 401, 405 
(Utah 1986). 
In assessing counsel's performance under the first 
component of the test, we recognize fl>the variety of 
circumstances faced by defense counsel [and] the range of 
legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal 
defendant.'" Templin, 805 P.2d at 186 (quoting Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 689). For this reason, a defendant must "overcome the 
strong presumption that trial counsel rendered adequate 
assistance and exercised reasonable professional judgment.11 
State v. Bullock. 791 P.2d 155, 159-60 (Utah), cert, denied, 110 
S. Ct. 3270 (1989). 
To show prejudice under the second component of the 
test, a defendant must proffer sufficient evidence to support "a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Templin. 805 P.2d at 187; Carter. 
776 P.2d at 894 n.30. When a defendant challenges a death 
sentence, "the question is whether there is a reasonable 
probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer . . . would 
have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances did not warrant death." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
695. Reasonable probability means a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the reliability of the sentence. Id.; 
Frame, 723 P.2d at 405. 
Parsons urges us to "abandon the second prong of the 
Strickland test." He argues that showing counsel's 
professionally unreasonable conduct ought to be sufficient to 
establish a violation of the right to effective assistance of 
counsel. Surprisingly, he relies on our decision in Templin, 805 
P.2d at 186, where we specifically held that a "defendant has the 
burden of meeting both parts of [the Strickland] test." 
We will not abandon one part of the Supreme Court's 
two-part analysis. The requirement that a defendant 
affirmatively prove prejudice is grounded in the very purpose of 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel—"to ensure that a defendant 
has the assistance necessary to justify reliance on the outcome 
of the proceeding." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691-92. As the 
Supreme Court recently explained: 
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"[T]he right to the effective assistance of 
counsel is recognized not for its own sake, 
but because of the effect it has on the 
ability of the accused to receive a fair 
trial. Absent some effect of challenged 
conduct on the reliability of the trial 
process, the Sixth Amendment guaranty is 
generally not implicated." 
Lockhart v, Fretwell. 122 L. Ed. 2d 180, 188-89 (1993) (que* ^ ng 
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984)). Unless > 
defendant shows both deficient conduct of counsel and prejudice, 
"it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted 
from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result 
unreliable." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (emphasis added). 
Absent the prejudice requirement, a defendant could 
show ineffective assistance merely by demonstrating that 
counsel's errors fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness. Attorney errors would be categorized according 
to likelihood of prejudice rather than actual effect on the 
proceeding itself. This would provide a windfall to many 
defendants because errors of counsel "come in an infinite variety 
and are as likely to be utterly harmless in a particular case as 
they are to be prejudicial." Id. at 693. Legal representation 
that is "unprofessional in one case may be sound or even 
brilliant in another." Id. The "prejudice" component of the 
Strickland test prevents this potential windfall by insisting on 
a nexus between the deficient performance of counsel and the 
reliability of the verdict or sentence. 
For these reasons, we have consistently required 
defendants claiming ineffective assistance of counsel to 
affirmatively prove both prongs of the Strickland test to 
prevail, Fernandez v. Cook, P.2d , (Utah 1993); 
State v. Tvler, 850 P.2d 1250, 1253-54 (Utah 1993); Tempiin. 805 
P.2d at 186-87; Bullock, 791 P.2d at 159; Carter. 776 P.2d at 
893; State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116, 118 n.2 (Utah 1989); Bundv, 
763 P.2d at 805; State v. Lovell, 758 P.2d 909, 913 (Utah 1988); 
Frame, 723 P.2d at 405, and we will continue to do so. 
As an alternative to abandoning the prejudice 
requirement of the Strickland analysis, Parsons urges us to 
"limit its application" to circumstances under which a defendant 
"might reasonably be expected" to meet the requirement. In his 
view, this limitation is necessary because incarcerated, indigent 
defendants do not have the resources necessary to show that 
absent counsel's errors the result of their trial or sentencing 
hearing would have been different. Parsons also contends that 
some issues simply do not lend themselves to a showing of 
prejudice. While we recognize that the Strickland test imposes a 
"difficult burden" on defendants, Tylerf 850 P.2d at 1259, we 
cannot adopt his proposed limitations. 
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In effect, Parsons is requesting that prejudice be 
presumed because of his indigent status. In Strickland, the 
Supreme Court recognized that "in certain Sixth Amendment 
contexts, prejudice is presumed." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692. 
These circumstances include the "[a]ctual or constructive denial 
of the assistance of counsel altogether/1 as well as "various 
kinds of state interference with counsel's assistance." Id. 
Prejudice may also be presumed where counsel had a conflict of 
interest.6 Id. The indigent status of a defendant is not 
expressly enumerated by the Supreme Court as a circumstance when 
prejudice will be presumed. Moreover, we note that the 
recognized circumstances for presuming prejudice arise, not from 
the status of the defendant, but from the state's interference 
with the right to counsel and the attorney's duty of loyalty. In 
deciding ineffective assistance allegations, our ultimate focus 
must be the effect of counsel's conduct on the reliability of the 
proceeding, not the defendant's personal characteristics. 
Before applying the Strickland test to each of Parsons' 
ineffective assistance claims, we note that it is not necessary 
for us "to address both components of the inquiry if [he] makes 
an insufficient showing on one." Strickland, 4 66 U.S. at 697; 
see, e.g., Carter, 776 P.2d at 893; Bundv, 763 P.2d at 805-06. 
When it is "easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the 
ground of lack of sufficient prejudice," we will do so without 
addressing whether counsel's performance was professionally 
unreasonable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697; Carter, 776 P.2d at 
893; Bundv, 763 P.2d at 805-06. 
1. Failure to Object to Sworn Statements 
As explained above, the prosecutor's taking sworn 
statements without giving notice to the defense did not violate 
Parsons' rights to counsel, to confront witnesses, or to due 
process. Therefore, counsel's failure to object or to raise the 
issue on appeal was not professionally unreasonable. 
6
 As a constitutional matter, a conflict of interest will 
not give rise to a presumption of prejudice unless a defendant 
shows that counsel "xactively represented conflicting interests'" 
and that "xan actual conflict of interest adversely affected his 
lawyer's performance.'11 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692 (quoting 
Cuvler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980). However, pursuant 
to our "inherent supervisory power over the courts," we may 
presume prejudice in circumstances where it is "unnecessary and 
ill-advised to pursue a case-by-case inquiry to weigh actual 
prejudice." State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 857, 859 (Utah 1992) 
(while it may or may not be constitutionally impermissible, 
representation of a defendant by a part-time city prosecutor is 
prejudice per se). 
No. 920126 10 
2. Substandard Investigation 
Parsons has consistently maintained that he reacted 
violently to Ernest's sexual advances. He contends that this was 
the "primary mitigating circumstance" and that his counsel failed 
to adequately investigate the victim's homosexual tendencies. 
Specifically, he argues that his counsel should have requested an 
autopsy examination of the victim and used the private 
investigator provided by the State. While we fail to see how 
this evidence is mitigating, we will assume for purposes of 
argument that it is. 
Parsons cannot meet the prejudice prong of the 
Strickland test simply by identifying unexplored avenues of 
investigation. Rather, he must demonstrate a reasonable 
probability that further investigation would have yielded 
sufficient information to alter the outcome of his sentencing 
hearing. Aside from Parsons' testimony, nothing in the record 
indicates that the victim had homosexual inclinations. At the 
penalty hearing, Mrs. Ernest emphatically testified that her late 
husband had no homosexual tendencies. She stated that after 
their separation, her husband began seeing two other women and 
that he previously had an affair with a woman in Texas. In her 
sworn statement to the prosecutor, Mrs. Ernest stated that her 
husband had a girlfriend at the time she met him and that during 
their marriage he associated with another attractive woman whom 
he kissed and cared for very much. Bruce Opp, a friend of the 
victim, testified at the penalty hearing that "homosexuality was 
the farthest thing from [the victim's] mind" and that the victim 
dated other women after his separation from Mrs. Ernest. The 
victim's father-in-law testified that homosexuality was "very 
distasteful" to Ernest and something he did not want to be a part 
of. Finally, after investigation, the prosecution concluded that 
"everything about the victim" indicated that he was "a completely 
heterosexual family-man." In light of this overwhelming evidence 
procured from Ernest's closest associates, it is unlikely that 
further investigation by defense counsel would have yielded 
information to the contrary. 
3. Entry of Guilty Plea 
Parsons alleges two instances of ineffective assistance 
concerning his guilty plea. First, he contends that counsel 
advised him to plead guilty without securing any meaningful 
benefit in return. Second, he asserts that the prosecution 
improperly induced his guilty plea by refusing to waive the 
preliminary hearing and that defense counsel failed to object to 
this procedural duress or raise it on appeal. 
In proving that counsel's conduct fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness, we "indulge a strong 
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of 
reasonable professional assistance." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
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689. In other words, Parsons "must overcome the presumption 
that, under the circumstances, the challenged action *might be 
considered sound trial strategy.'" Id. He has not overcome this 
presumption. 
The record indicates that the advice to plead guilty 
was part of a legitimate trial strategy and was therefore 
professionally reasonable. At the habeas proceeding, former 
defense counsel testified that a guilty plea would blunt the 
thrust of the evidence presented to the sentencing jury by not 
allowing the State to emphasize and reemphasize the details of 
the crime during the guilt phase. In addition, the plea would 
prevent the emotional momentum of the guilt phase from pouring 
over into the jury's sentencing deliberations. Counsel discussed 
this strategy with Parsons in detail. 
The habeas court found, and we agree, that "it was a 
legitimate trial strategy to decide that it was not to Parsons' 
advantage to have the same jury consider both the evidence 
related to guilt or innocence . . . and then consider the 
evidence related to punishment." This court "will not review 
counsel's tactical decisions simply because another lawyer, e.g., 
appellate counsel, would have taken a different course." State 
v. Jones, 823 P.2d 1059, 1063 (Utah 1991). Likewise, whenever 
there is "a legitimate exercise of professional judgment in the 
choice of trial strategy, the fact that it did not produce the 
expected result does not constitute ineffectiveness of counsel." 
Bullock, 791 P.2d at 160; see, e.g., Tyler, 850 P.2d at 1258 (a 
defendant is "not guaranteed successful assistance of counsel," 
and "competency of counsel is not measured by the result"). 
In addition, Parsons received benefits that were 
meaningful to him in exchange for his plea, the most important of 
which was the termination of the preliminary hearing. According 
to the record, he had "no desire whatsoever to go through the 
preliminary hearing." Defense counsel asked the prosecutor on 
several occasions to waive the hearing, but the prosecutor 
refused. An hour and a half into the hearing, Parsons became 
"very agitated and upset" and "did not want [the hearing] to 
proceed." He communicated this desire to counsel and authorized 
his counsel to "just do whatever it takes to get this thing 
stopped." The prosecutor testified that Parsons stood and said 
in open court, "I did it, they know I did it. Why are we going 
through with all of this? I want to stop this now. I don't care 
what you have to do. Stop it." The proceedings recessed, and 
Parsons decided to plead guilty in accordance with the trial 
strategy outlined above. The record simply belies his contention 
that terminating the preliminary hearing was not a meaningful 
benefit to him. 
Finally, Parsons argues that the prosecutor refused to 
consent to waive the preliminary hearing as a means of inducing 
him to enter a guilty plea and that his counsel should have 
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objected to this tactic or insisted on Parsons' right to waive 
the hearing without the prosecutor's consent. Such a course 
would have been in direct conflict with rule 7 of the Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure. Rule 7 provides in part: 
During the initial appearance before the 
magistrate, the defendant shall be advised of 
his right to a preliminary examination. If 
the defendant waives his right to a 
preliminary examination, and the prosecuting 
attorney consents, the magistrate shall order 
the defendant bound over to answer in the 
district court. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 7(g)(1) (emphasis added). The rule imposes no 
conditions on the prosecutor's right to withhold consent. 
Therefore, defense counsel's failure to object to the 
prosecutor's refusing consent was not ineffective assistance. 
Furthermore, Parsons has failed to show the requisite 
prejudice. Where a defendant challenges a guilty plea on grounds 
of ineffective assistance of counsel, he or she must show "a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he [or 
she] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on 
going to trial." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). In 
other words, counsel's deficient performance must have "affected 
the outcome of the plea process." Id. There is no evidence in 
the record that Parsons ever intended to go to trial. On the 
contrary, he consistently maintained his guilt, admitting in open 
court at the preliminary hearing that he killed the victim. 
Likewise, he has not sought to withdraw his guilty plea but 
argues only to have his sentence vacated. Because he has never 
desired to go to trial, we cannot conclude that he was prejudiced 
by counsel's advice to plead guilty. 
4. Juror-Witness Contact 
During the penalty hearing, a juror conversed briefly 
with a prosecution witness. Parsons contends that his counsel's 
failure to interrogate both the juror and the witness and to 
preserve the issue for direct appeal constituted ineffective 
assistance of counsel. We disagree. 
Parsons raised this issue on direct appeal, arguing 
that the juror-witness contact tainted the jury. We dismissed 
this argument, refusing to allow Parsons to "vacate his sentence 
by alleging on appeal prejudicial error" that he had 
"affirmatively, knowingly, and intentionally waived at the 
sentencing proceeding." State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1285 
(Utah 1989). More importantly, however, we concluded that 
"[e]ven analyzing the facts under the standards provided in State 
v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277, 279-81 (Utah 1985), we could find no 
error." Id. (emphasis added). Because no error resulted from 
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the juror's contact with the prosecution witness, counsel's 
failure to interrogate the witness cannot be deemed ineffective 
assistance. Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1109 (Utah 1983) 
("The failure of counsel to make motions or objections which 
would be futile if raised does not constitute ineffective 
assistance."). 
5. Failure to File Discovery Request 
Parsons next contends that his counsel's failure to 
move for formal discovery was ineffective assistance. Rule 16 of 
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that the prosecutor 
shall disclose "to the defense upon request" certain "material or 
information of which he has knowledge." Utah R. Crim. P. 
16(a)(l)-(5). The "request" contemplated in rule 16 is a written 
request for discovery filed at least five days prior to trial as 
provided for in rule 12. Utah R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3); State v. 
Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 346 (Utah 1985). Rule 16, however, 
provides for informal discovery "when convenience reasonably 
requires." Utah R. Crim. P. 16(e). Informal discovery permits 
the prosecutor or defense to "make disclosure by notifying the 
opposing party that material and information may be inspected, 
tested or copied at specified reasonable times and places." Id. 
The discovery in this case was informal. The 
prosecutor had an "open file policy" pursuant to which all 
evidence and documents were "given to the defense, simultaneously 
with [the prosecutor's] receiving it." At the habeas proceeding, 
the prosecutor testified that "everything [he] had was given to 
[defense counsel] and Mr. Parsons from day one." Likewise, 
defense counsel testified that the State did not use any evidence 
at trial that he had not seen before. 
To prove prejudice, Parsons must show that filing a 
formal discovery motion would have yielded exculpatory 
information that the "open file policy" did not yield. He has 
not done so. Admittedly, a defendant who does not file a written 
request for discovery under rule 12 qannot on appeal assign error 
to the failure of the prosecutor to disclose the "material or 
information" described in rule 16(a)(1) to (5). Booker. 709 P.2d 
at 346. However, Parsons has not proffered any evidence that 
such undisclosed material or information existed. Speculation 
that it exists is not sufficient to meet the prejudice component 
of the Strickland test. Fernandez v. Cook, P.2d , 
(Utah 1993) ("On many occasions, this court has reiterated that 
proof of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be a 
speculative matter but must be a demonstrable reality."). 
6. Inadequate Trial Preparation 
Parsons contends that counsel spent inadequate time 
with him in preparing for the sentencing hearing. At the habeas 
proceeding, he testified that counsel spent only between four and 
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five hours with him. Former defense counsel, on the other hand, 
testified that he spent about twenty hours with Parsons. Parsons 
argues that it is ineffective per se for counsel in a homicide 
case to meet with the defendant for between four and twenty 
hours. 
We decline to determine what amount of time counsel 
must spend with a defendant to ensure that the representation 
does not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. 
Clearly, the time period will vary with every case. Rather, we 
dismiss Parsons' argument because he has not shown prejudice. He 
has not proffered any evidence that counsel overlooked 
information critical to the defense as a result of spending too 
little time with him in preparation. In the absence of this 
evidence, we cannot find that the outcome of the sentencing 
hearing would have been different if defense counsel had spent 
more time with Parsons. 
7. Failure to Conduct Adequate Voir Dire 
Parsons argues that his counsel failed to conduct 
adequate voir dire. Specifically, he claims that while counsel 
asked the jurors whether they had heard or read anything about 
the case, he failed to ask them what they had heard or read. 
Thus, counsel did not create a record from which an appellate 
court could determine whether juror exposure to the media 
resulted in prejudice. 
According to the record, the court asked the jurors 
whether and from what source they had heard or read anything 
about the case and whether they had formed an opinion as to the 
appropriate outcome. Three jurors had not been exposed to any 
media reports on the case. Seven had read articles in The 
Spectrumf the local newspaper. Of these seven, one had also 
heard radio reports and another had read an article in the 
Deseret News. Of the two remaining jurors, one had heard a 
television report, and the other, a radio report. 
The court also asked whether the jurors could set aside 
any outside information and base their decision on the evidence 
presented in court. Each juror answered affirmatively. Finally, 
the court asked the jurors whether they as defendants would be 
willing to be tried by twelve persons just like themselves in 
light of their preexisting knowledge of the case. Each juror 
responded affirmatively. 
Parsons has not demonstrated that further inquiry into 
each juror's exposure to media reports would have altered the 
outcome of his sentencing hearing. The media coverage to which 
five jurors had been exposed was limited to a single local 
newspaper. The juror who had heard a television report had 
little memory of it, and three jurors had not heard or read 
anything at all. Parsons has not produced any evidence that the 
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content of The Spectrum's articles, the radio reports, and the 
television coverage predisposed the jurors to impose the death 
penalty. Thus, he has failed to show a reasonable probability 
that the outcome of his sentencing hearing would have been 
different but for counsel's failure to further inquire into the 
content of the media coverage to which the venire had been 
exposed. 
8. The Special Verdict Form 
On direct appeal, Parsons argued that the court "misled 
the jury by giving special verdict instructions and questions on 
aggravating circumstances while only generally instructing on 
mitigating circumstances." Parsons, 781 P.2d at 1279. He 
contended that the effect of the special verdict form was to 
mislead the jury so that it could find "only aggravating 
circumstances and no mitigating circumstances in determining his 
sentence." Id. He further argued that special verdict forms 
should be forbidden in capital sentencing proceedings or that 
courts should be required to give special verdict instructions on 
both aggravating and mitigating factors. Id. We rejected this 
argument, holding that giving special verdict questions on 
aggravating factors but not mitigating factors did not mislead 
the jury. 
In the habeas proceeding, Parsons attacked the special 
verdict form a second time. The form contained three questions. 
The first asked whether the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant committed the murder in the course of an 
aggravated robbery. The second asked whether the jury found 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally killed 
the victim for pecuniary gain. The final question asked whether 
the jury similarly found that the defendant, "being a person on 
parole, knowingly possessed or had in his custody or under his 
control a firearm." 
Parsons first argues that including the third question 
on the special verdict form—whether the jury could find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant, "being a person on parole, 
knowingly possessed or had in his custody or under his control a 
firearm"—was error because a parolee's possession of a firearm 
is not an aggravating factor enumerated in section 76-5-202. 
This fact, however, is immaterial and could not have prejudiced 
Parsons. In the penalty phase, the sentencer may consider any 
relevant facts in aggravation or mitigation of the penalty. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207(2). Inclusion in section 76-5-202 is 
not a prerequisite for consideration by the sentencing body. 
Parsons also contends that in addition to the three 
questions outlined above, the special verdict form should have 
asked the jury whether it could find beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant, having been previously convicted of a felony 
involving the use or threat of violence to another person, 
No. 920126 16 
intentionally or knowingly caused the death of another. He 
argues that omitting this aggravating factor "gave the jury an 
opportunity to find a cause for imposing the death penalty 
without recording any vote on the special verdict form.11 
According to Parsons, counsel,s failure to object on this ground 
constituted ineffective assistance. We disagree. Parsons' 
previous commission of a felony involving the use or threat of 
violence to another was the aggravating factor in section 
76-5-202 that elevated his crime from second to first degree 
murder. It was this aggravating factor to which he pleaded 
guilty. Therefore, including it on the special verdict form 
would have been a superfluous formality, not an outcome-altering 
error. 
Finally, Parsons contends that because an element of 
the crime of robbery is the "taking of personal property in the 
possession of another," then that crime will always be committed 
for pecuniary or other personal gain. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301. 
Section 76-5-202 of the Utah Code lists, among many others, the 
following two aggravating factors to be considered by the court 
or jury at sentencing: 
(d) The homicide was committed while 
the actor was engaged in the commission of, 
or an attempt to commit, or flight after 
committing or attempting to commit, 
aggravated robbery, robbery . . . . 
(f) The homicide was committed for 
pecuniary or other personal gain. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1) (Supp. 1993). The special verdict 
form in this case listed both as potential aggravating factors. 
Parsons contends that the resulting effect of the special verdict 
form was to "split the single act of robbery into two potential |^ aggravating circumstances . . . when only one should have been 
/ presented for consideration." According to Parsons, this 
' "double-counting" misled the jury to impose the sentence of death 
and should have been objected to by counsel. 
J/ In Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 246 (1988), the 
[yV United States Supreme Court held that the aggravating 
/ circumstance used in the sentencing phase of a trial can 
duplicate an element of the underlying offense without violating 
the Eighth Amendment of the federal constitution. Under the Utah 
sentencing scheme this type of double-counting occurs. Section 
76-5-202 of the Utah Code enumerates several aggravating elements 
that elevate a homicide from second to first degree or aggravated 
murder. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1)(a)-(q) (Supp. 1993). 
Section 76-3-207 permits the sentencing jury to consider these 
same elements as aggravating factors during the penalty phase of 
a trial. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207(3) (Supp. 1993). Like the 
United States Supreme Court, we have held that counting a single 
17 No. 920126 
aggravating circumstance in both the guilt and the penalty phase 
of a trial does not render Utah/s sentencing scheme 
unconstitutional. State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 460 n.65 (Utah 
1988). 
However, Parsons raises a different kind of "double-
counting." He contends that including both the robbery-murder 
factor and the pecuniary-gain factor on the special verdict form 
unfairly divided a single act of the defendant, aggravated 
robbery, into two aggravating factors. This double-counting 
differs from that declared constitutional in Lowenfield and 
Bishop. Here, the double-counting occurs solely in the penalty 
phase of the trial and involves, not the double-counting of a 
single aggravating factor, but the double-counting of a single 
act of the defendant. 
In failing to object to the special verdict form on 
these grounds, counsel's performance fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness. The Supreme Court has held that the 
discretion of sentencing juries must be "suitably directed and 
limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and 
capricious action." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976). 
To achieve this channeled discretion, each aggravating factor 
"must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the 
death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a 
more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found 
guilty of murder." Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983). 
When considered together in aggravation, the robbery-
murder factor and the pecuniary-gain factor do not narrow the 
class of defendants eligible for the death penalty. One element 
of the crime of robbery is the "taking of personal property in 
the possession of another." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301(1). 
Thus, robbery inherently comprises an attempt to gain 
pecuniarily. It is nonsensical to say that a defendant who 
commits a homicide during the commission of a robbery is somehow 
more deserving of the death penalty because he also committed the 
murder for pecuniary gain. 
In addition, under the present scheme, defendants who 
commit a homicide in the course of a robbery will always begin 
the sentencing hearing with two aggravating factors against them 
for no other reason than that the underlying felony was robbery. 
Engberg v. Meyer. 820 P.2d 70, 89 (Wyo. 1991); Provence v. State, 
337 So. 2d 783, 786 (Fla.), cert, denied, 431 U.S. 969 (1976). 
Defendants who commit a homicide in the course of any other 
enumerated felony are not similarly disadvantaged. T^jg I'SL. 
inherently unfair. In the words of the Mississippi Supreme 
Court, "When life is at stake, a jury cannot be allowed the 
opportunity to doubly weigh the commission of the underlying 
felony and the motive behind [the] underlying felony as separate 
aggravators." Willie v. State, 585 So. 2d 660, 681 (Miss. 1991); 
see Cook v. State, 369 So. 2d 1251, 1256-57 (Ala. 1979); People 
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v. Mickey, 286 Cal. Rptr. 801, 835 (Cal. 1991) (modifying People 
v, Bicrelow, 37 Cal. 3d 731, 691 P.2d 994, 209 Cal. Rptr. 328 
(1984)); Provence, 337 So. 2d at 786; State v. Rust. 250 N.W.2d 
867, 873-74 (Neb.), cert, denied. 434 U.S. 912 (1977); Engberg, 
820 P.2d at 89. 
For these reasons, in the future, jury instructions or 
special vercict forms which contain either of the two murder-
robbery factors in section 76-5-202(1)(d) should not contain the 
pecuniary-gain factor as well. Otherwise, a defendant is 
essentially condemned "twice for the same culpable act." Cook, 
369 So. 2d at 1256. As a general rule, courts should construe 
the aggravating factors in section 76-5-202 so as to "minimize 
those cases in which multiple circumstances will apply to the 
same conduct, thereby reducing the risk that multiple findings on 
[aggravating] . . . circumstances will prejudice the 
defendant."7 People v. Biqelow, 37 Cal. 3d 731, 691 P.2d 994, 
1006, 209 Cal. Rptr. 328 (1984). If the aggravating factors in 
section 76-5-202 are to "genuinely narrow the class of persons 
7
 As worded, section 76-5-202 arguably creates this risk. A 
careful reading reveals that multiple aggravating factors may 
frequently apply to the same conduct of a defendant under 
subpart (d). For example, a person commits aggravated kidnapping 
when he or she "intentionally or knowingly, without authority of 
law and against the will of the victim, . . . detains or 
transports the victim with intent to hold for ransom." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-302. If the perpetrator kills the victim in the 
process, section 76-5-202 arguably splits the single act of 
aggravated kidnapping into two aggravating factors—aggravated 
kidnapping under subpart (d) and pecuniary gain under 
subpart (f) . Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (1) (d) , (f) . 
Likewise, a person is guilty of aggravated arson if "by 
means of fire or explosives he [or she] intentionally and 
unlawfully damages any structure or vehicle when any person not a 
participant in the offense is in the structure or vehicle." Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-103(1). If two persons are in the structure but 
only one dies, the single act of aggravated arson may give rise 
to two aggravating factors in section 76-5-202: The homicide 
occurred in the course of aggravated arson and "created a great 
risk of death to a person other than the victim." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-202(1) (c), (d) . 
Further, section 76-5-202 now provides that aggravated 
murder, formerly "first degree murder," occurs when the 
"defendant committed . . . the homicide pursuant to an agreement 
or contract for remuneration." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(g) 
(Supp. 1993) . Where the defendant contracts for monetary 
remuneration in exchange for the killing, that single act may 
implicate both the pecuniary-gain factor under subsection (f) and 
the contract- or agreement-for-remuneration factor under 
subsection (g) . Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (f), (g) (Supp. 1993). 
19 No. 920126 
eligible for the death penalty," this rule of construction must 
be applied. Zant, 462 U.S. at 877. 
However, turning to the prejudice prong of the 
Strickland test, we do not find a reasonable probability that if 
counsel had objected to the double-counting described above, the 
sentencing jury would have concluded that "the balance of 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death." 
Strickland. 466 U.S. at 695. The jury was instructed 
sufficiently to cure any prejudice that may have resulted from 
the improper double-counting on the special verdict form. 
The court instructed the jury to answer the special 
verdict questions "prior to entering [its] verdict" and as an 
"aid in [its] deliberations." Further, the court instructed the 
jury that H[i]f the final vote of the jury members is xNo' or 
less than a unanimous *Yes' as to any special verdict question, 
then you may not consider the elements of that individual 
question as aggravating circumstances." By requiring a 
"unanimous determination on each of three aggravating factors 
before they could be weighed against the mitigating factors," the 
special verdict form operated as a "safeguard" to Parsons. State 
v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1280 (Utah 1989). 
In addition, the court specifically instructed the jury 
that it must weigh the totality of the mitigating factors against 
the totality of the aggravating factors, "not in terms of the 
relative numbers of the aggravating and mitigating factors, but 
in terms of their respective substantiality and persuasiveness" 
(emphasis added). This instruction is in "meticulous compliance" 
with the standards we set forth in State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 
83-85 (Utah), cert, denied. 459 U.S. 988 (1982); Parsons, 781 
P.2d at 1280. 
In deciding whether Parsons was prejudiced, we must 
conclude that the jury did as it was instructed to do. No 
defendant is entitled "to the luck of a lawless decision-maker." 
Stricklandf 4 66 U.S. at 695. Therefore, our assessment of 
prejudice proceeds "on the assumption that the decision maker is 
reasonably, conscientiously, and impartially applying the 
standards that govern the decision." Id. Because the jury did 
not consider any aggravating factor without first finding that it 
existed beyond a reasonable doubt and because the jury weighed 
the persuasiveness, not the number, of aggravating factors, we 
cannot find that eliminating the pecuniary-gain question from the 
special verdict form would have changed the outcome of Parsons' 
hearing. 
CUMULATIVE ERROR 
Because Parsons has failed to establish any errors of 
counsel that prejudiced his right to a fair trial, the doctrine 
of cumulative error does not apply. Bundy v. DeLand, 763 P.2d 
No. 920126 20 
803, 806 (Utah 1988) (citing State v, Ellis, 748 P.2d 188, 191 
(Utah 1987)); State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498, 501-02 (Utah 1986). 
RIGHT TO STATE-COMPENSATED COUNSEL IN HABEAS PROCEEDINGS 
In his habeas proceeding, Parsons argued that under the 
federal and state constitutions, defendants pursuing habeas 
relief for the first time were entitled to counsel compensated by 
the state. The United States Supreme Court has held that neither 
the Due Process Clause nor the equal protection guarantee of 
meaningful access requires a state to provide counsel for 
indigent defendants seeking postconviction relief. Pennsylvania 
v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555-56 (1987) (citing Ross v. Moffit, 
417 U.S. 600, 610-11 (1974)). This rule applies with equal force 
to defendants convicted of capital crimes. Murray v. Giarratano, 
492 U.S. 1, 10 (1989). 
We decline to address and decide in this proceeding 
whether under the Utah Constitution appointed counsel in a first 
habeas proceeding has a right to be compensated by the state. 
The district court opined that it was an issue which should be 
resolved legislatively. If that course is not to be followed and 
the question is to be resolved by the judiciary because of its 
far-reaching impact, it should be addressed in a proceeding where 
all affected parties, organizations, agencies, and entities are 
invited to participate in the briefing and oral argument, not 
limited to the parties of a single case such as we now have 
before us. 
In denying compensation to appointed counsel, we are 
not unmindful of the generous contribution of their time and 
resources to this case. We thank them for the high quality of 
their professional effort in behalf of Parsons. 
The denial of the writ is affirmed. 
WE CONCUR: 
I. Daniel Stewart, Associate 
Chief Justice 
Gordon R. Hall, Justice 
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ZIMMERMAN, Chief Justice, concurring: 
I concur in Justice Howe's opinion. However, I write 
to note that we continue to sidestep an issue that cannot be 
ignored much longer, i.e., whether those who have been convicted 
of a crime but cannot afford a lawyer should have a right to paid 
counsel in connection with their initial postconviction 
proceeding. 
The traditional view on this issue, epitomized by the 
United States Supreme Court decisions cited by Justice Howe,.is, 
founded on a number of fictions. Among them are the following: 
the assertion mat postconviction proceedings are "civil" and not 
an integral part of the usual criminal prosecution; the refusal 
to acknowledge that a number of legal doctrines, most notably the 
ineffectiveness of counsel rulings by the United States Supreme 
Court, have virtually mandated at least one postconviction 
evidentiary hearing and subsequent appeal before even the most 
diligent defendant's legal remedies are exhausted; and the legal 
fiction, indeed deliberate fantasy, that these extraordinary, 
complex legal doctrines and the associated postconviction 
proceedings can be handled competently by an unrepresented 
indigent defendant. 
Much of the successive postconviction writ practice 
that currently incites public wrath against the criminal justice 
system can be traced directly to the fact that the system 
persists in refusing to assure that a defendant has adequate 
counsel in the initial postconviction proceeding. In the face of 
this fact, it is hardly surprising that the courts remain 
reluctant to shut the courthouse doors on defendants who have 
never had a fair opportunity to fully litigate their claim to 
rights bestowed upon them by the federal and state constitutions. 
See, e.g., Fernandez v. Cook, 783 P.2d 547 (Utah 1989) (holding 
that ineffectiveness-of-counsel claim can be raised for first 
time in postconviction proceeding when trial counsel handled 
initial appeal from conviction). 
The public, the judiciary, and even the prosecutorial 
agencies would be better served if we took our collective heads 
out of the sand and acted to ensure free counsel to indigent 
defendants for one omnibus postconviction proceeding. Today may 
not be the day, nor this the case, on which to address the 
constitutional questions raised by the current state of affairs. 
But the time draws nigh when we will be unable to continue 
avoiding reality in the name of outworn legal fictions. I 
acknowledge that there may be a number of unspoken administrative 
and financial considerations that support the present state of 
affairs. But none of them can withstand scrutiny if the 
"criminal justice" system is to be worthy of its name. See 
No. 920126 22 
Gerrish v. Barnes, 844 P.2d 315, 321 (Utah 1991) (Zimmerman, J., 
concurring).x 
Durham, Justice, concurs in the concurring opinion of 
Chief Justice Zimmerman. 
Hall, Justice, acted on this case prior to his 
retirement. 
1
 There are recent indications that the Utah Bar in general 
may be taking note of problems with the present system that 
criminal lawyers have known about for a long time. See Randy L. 
Dryer, Habeas Corpus Practice In Utah—A Franz Kafka Mind 
Boggier?, Utah Bar J., May 1993, at 4. 
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ADDENDUM II 
MOTION AND ORDER FOR ADDITIONAL 
TIME TO FILE 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
ORIGINAL 
F I L E D 
JAN 2 5 1994 
CLERK SUPREME COURT 
UTAH 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JOSEPH MITCHELL PARSONS, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
M. ELDON BARNES, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
MOTION FOR ADDITIONAL TIME 
TO FILE PETITION FOR 
REHEARING 
Appeal No. 920126 
Plaintiff/Appellant Joseph Mitchell Parsons, pursuant to 
Rule 22(c) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, hereby moves this 
Court for an additional fourteen (14) days within which to file a 
Petition for Rehearing. 
This motion is premised on the fact that counsel for 
plaintiff/appellant is reviewing the opinion for potential issues 
for resolution by the Court on rehearing. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2$ day of January, 1994. 
4^Uw 
RONALD J. YENGICH,/ #3^0 
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
175 East 400 South, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 355-0320 
GREGORY/^' SAffDERS / 
KIPP 6 CHRISTIAN 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
175 East 400 South, Suite 330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-3773 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby declare that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Motion for Additional Time to File Petition for 
Rehearing, postage prepaid, this f*l y^  day of January, 1994, to 
Kris Leonard, Assistant Attorney General, 236 State Capitol, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, 84114. 
- 2 
ORIGINAL 
F I L E D 
JAN 2 5 1994 
CLERK SUPREME COURT 
UTAH 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OF UTAH 
JOSEPH MITCHELL PARSONS, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
M. ELDON BARNES, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
ORDER GRANTING ADDITIONAL 
TIME TO FILE PETITION FOR 
REHEARING 
Appeal No. 920126 
Based upon the motion of plaintiff/appellant Joseph 
Mitchell Parsons, and for good cause shown, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff/appellant Joseph 
Mitchell Parsons be granted an additional fourteen (14) days within 
which to file a Petition for Rehearing. 
SIGNED BY MY HAND this $ ** day of January, 1094. 
BY THE COURT: 
•^ /l^C* 
'? 
i 
UTAH SUPREME COURT JUSTICE 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby declare that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing proposed Order Granting Additional Time to File 
Petition for Rehearing, postage prepaid, this A S"" day of January, 
1994, to Kris Leonard, Assistant Attorney General, 236 State 
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114. 
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